We have covered most of the macro-materials
This week:
We have discussed how generally we divide our wealth:
whatever we do that's not consumption is considered an investment:
Why do we save?
Given the same amount of money, we like to have money now rather than later.
What determine our willingness to part with our money today?
People still like money now rather than later, though.
Suppose you want to plan a holiday for next year, and you need Rp10 million to do that.
If you put your money in a Bank Mandiri time deposit with 2.85% per annum (p.a.), you will only need $$\frac{10M}{1+0.0285}=9.73M$$
These days, it is very possible to purchase your holiday tickets in advance.
You can always use the interest rate to calculate how much cost you want to pay in advance.
For example, if the cost of plane tickets and hotels you pay right now is less than Rp9.73 million, it's better to pay them instead of putting it in the deposit.
Note that you might have an alternative to deposit which pays higher returns (eg SUN or stocks).
Time deposit is also somewhat safer should you change your mind or changes in circumstances (eg travel ban).
Exchange rate effect is similar to interest rate: remember, it is basically the value of your currency.
The present value of something is the total of discounted stream of future face values.
Interest rate is usually used as the discount rate.
Suppose \(r_1\) is the interest rate in year 1, \(r_2\) is the interest rate in year 2, etc:
$$PV=A_0+\frac{A_1}{1+r_1}+\frac{A_2}{(1+r_1)(1+r_2)}+\frac{A_3}{(1+r_1)(1+r_2)(1+r_3)}+...$$
where A is a stream of payment / return.
$$PV=\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{A}{(1+r)^t}$$ An annual payment forever has net present value:
$$PV=A \times \frac{1}{r}$$
With a fixed payment, the most important part is \(\frac{1}{r}\)
Using the forever payment rule is useful to calculate long spell of fixed interest rate.
A present value of payment for \(n\) number of years can be expressed as:
$$PV=A \times \frac{1}{r} \left( 1- \frac{1}{(1+r)^n} \right)$$
\begin{align} PV &= A \times \frac{1}{0.005} \left( 1- \frac{1}{(1+0.005)^{360}} \right) \\ PV &= A \times 166.79 \end{align}
\begin{align} A &= \frac{500M}{166.79} \\ A &= Rp 2,997,782. \\ A &\approx Rp 3 million. \end{align}
Thumb rule: your monthly payment should be at most \(\frac{1}{3}\) of your monthly income.
This calculation would vary based on interest rate and length of the installment.
we use NPV analysis as our main tool to decide whether to invest.
NPV usually looks like this:
$$NPV=-I+\frac{R_1}{1+r}+\frac{R_2}{(1+r)^2}+\frac{R_3}{(1+r)^3}+...$$
Where \(-I\) is the initial investment and \(R_t\) is the revenue in time \(t\).
Three main important things: knowing your \(-I\), \(r\) and \(R_t\).
Calculating investment cost can be hard and unpredictable.
Calculating \(R_t\) also problematic because of uncertainty
Project manager has an incentive to overstate the potential return while understate the investment cost.
In the case of internal financing, a firm can use potential return of other project as an interest rate.
An investment opportunity for a silver mine with this characteristics:
$$NPV_I=-4+\frac{-4}{1.18}+\frac{-4}{1.18^2}+\frac{-4}{1.18^3}$$
$$NPV_R=\frac{4}{1.18^4}+\frac{4}{1.18^5}+\frac{4}{1.18^6}+...+\frac{4}{1.18^{43}}$$
Year | Earnings ( $ M/year) | PV ( $ M) |
---|---|---|
0-3 | -4 | -12.69709 |
4-43 | 4 | 13.50711 |
Net | 0.81002 |
The net present value is barely positive, but still worth the investment.
The reason is the discount factor: 18% is very expensive cost of fund!
Some projects are riskier than others.
Take oil exploration, for example.
The value of an uncertain project can be calculated using expected value.
$$EV=\sum_i \pi_i \times V_i$$
Where \(\pi\) is a probability of a value \(V_i\) happen in an event \(i\)
An oil field exploration project characterised as follows:
$$NPV_R=\frac{1}{1.18}+\frac{1}{1.18^2}+...+\frac{1}{1.18^{20}}$$
$$NPV_R=5.352746$$
However, the successful exploration only has 10% chance.
Than means, expected value of a successful exploration is:
\begin{align} EV_R &= \pi_{success} \times V_{success} + \pi_{failed} \times V_{failed} \\ EV_R &= 0.1 \times 5.352746 + 0.9 \times 0 \\ EV_R &= 0.5352746 \\ EV_R &\approx 0.535 \end{align}
year | revenue | NPV |
---|---|---|
0 | -1 | -1 |
1-21 | EV | 0.535 |
net | -0.465 |
The exploration is not worth it.
An agent is a person or an entity that is tasked to do something for a principal.
If you are hired by a firm to do some work, you are the agent and the firm is the principal.
other examples:
principal | agent |
---|---|
board members | board of directors |
people | president |
president | government official |
seller | courier |
passanger | driver |
Agency problem arise because of the high cost of supervising
The agency game is as follows:
The principal has to design a contract that maximise his/her gain.
Suppose the principal offers a payment \(sx+y\), where \(y\) is a base salary, and \(s\) is a bonus depending on how much \(x\) the agent works.
A big \(s\) would incentivise the marketing to work more. While a big \(y\) would be the safest for them.
However, big \(s\) laid the risk to the agent:
This is the reason why many payment structure these days are based on variable work of agents:
Also the reason why labours prefer monthly payment, and labour union advocate for higher monthly payment.
An owner of a parking lot has no time to manage it. The owner hires an agent to do that.
The parking lot has various potential revenue: during a busy day, it can go up to Rp30 million. During a slowest day, it's just Rp5 million.
The owner (ie the principal) can hire an agent with two kind of contracts:
Option one is preferable when the parking lot is harder to supervise (eg the payment is not electronic) because the profit is in-line with the agent's interest.
Let a principal needs to repair its code to run faster. An upgraded version would benefit the principal Rp1 billion. The old version doesn't change the principal's profit.
The principal hire an agent who is an expert in this field. A contract is drafted to hire such agent.
The worker has two options: work hard will cost the agent Rp30 million, while work lazy will cost 0. This action is invisible to the principal.
High effort leads to \(\frac{2}{3}\) probability of useful product, while low effort has only \(\frac{1}{3}\) probability of producing good product.
good product will fix the code (hence benefit the principal Rp1 billion), while the bad product is worthless for the principal.
The agent can accept this contract or other contract which will give the agent Rp100 million without extra export.
The principal needs to design a contract such that maximise its benefit regardless of the agent's behavior.
The principal's problem:
However, the principal can offer a contract based on the product: high salary for good product, low salary for bad product.
This is the last material.
Next week, we will discuss the assignment and the answer to example 2.
We have covered most of the macro-materials
This week:
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