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The heterogenous impact of tariff and NTM
on Total Factor Productivity

Krisna Gupta
AIFIS-MSU Conference on Indonesian Studies
krisna.or.id

25 June 2021 (updated: 2021-06-24)

1

Hello!

via GIPHY

About me

About this paper

  • Part of my dissertation.

  • click s.id/krisna-aifis for the slides.

  • click here for the pre-print.

2

Introduction

  • Indonesian economic growth has been struggling to reach the pre-1998 level.

  • Development plans still trying to emphasize on manufacturing to carry Indonesian economy.

  • Globalization helps developing nations import capital, intermediate goods and know-how, exactly what Indonesia need.

  • This paper focuses more on the importance of trade policies on imported intermediate goods to Indonesian manufacturing growth.

  • Some findings:

    • restrictive import regulations hurt firms productivity.
    • Smaller firms affected more heavily.
3

Importance of intermediate goods

  • Intermediate inputs help firms' backward participation in Global Value Chain (World Bank 2020).

  • Help firms access better inputs (Amiti and Konings 2007; Bas and Strauss-Kahn 2014; Castellani and Fassio 2019; Ing, Yu and Zhang 2019).

  • Help firms innovate and be more productive (Fernandez and Farole 2018, Pane and Patunru 2019).

  • Improves access to more lucrative foreign markets (An and Maskus 2009; Cadot et al. 2013; Fugazza, Olarreaga and Ugarte 2017)

  • Closer ties of economic relationship also benefits non-economically.

4

Trend is on reverse

  • The government is hostile toward imports, more so lately.

    • Highly concern with current account deficit and exchange rate.
  • Tariff increases in general (see figure), also Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) (Munadi 2019).

  • Protectionism snowballs:

    • Steel appliances.
    • Corn and soybean chicken.
  • In other words, if your input is not competitive, your output also not competitive.

5

Data

  • Follows 1,512 firms from 2008-2012.

  • Survei Industri (SI)

    • Output, factors, ownership.
    • Highly unbalanced, many problematic zeroes.
  • Integrated customs data

    • Firms' import, HS-8 detail, source countries.
    • Only use matched SI-Customs firms.
  • Tariff collected from scrapping MoF's regulations.

  • NTMs from UNCTAD TRAINS.

    • 7 broad categories, mainly SPS and TBT.
6

Method: TFP regression

  • Follows approach by Amiti and Konings (2007) and Pane and Patunru (2019).

  • Using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) algorithm to get marginal productivity of labour (l), energy (n), intermediate input (m) and capital (k):

yit=β0+βllit+βnnit+ϕ(mit,kit)+μit

  • Predict TFP of each firm i at time t:

TFPit=yitβ^llit+β^nnit+β^mmit+β^kkit

7

Method: Trade policy variable

  • Tariff is scrapped from Ministry of Trade's regulations

    • around 7 of them consisting almost 10,000 tariff lines
    • Customs data include source country to assign specific tariff
    • Tariff coverage ratio is calculated per firm basis
  • Same treatment for NTMs

    • NTM data is count data. So it's not percent.

Cθit=TPθscitVθscitVθscit

8

Method: Final regression

  • Lastly, log TFP is regressed as the function trade policies, ownership, firm fix effect and industry fix effect.

tfpit=γ0+θγθcθit+θδθcθitlit+FOit+αi+ISICi+ηit

  • The term δθ shows the different impact of trade policies among firm with different size, measured in the number of labor.
9

Results

Variables TFP VaL
tariff -0.371*** 0.259**
(0.077) (0.104)
tariff.l 0.068*** -0.048**
(0.014) (0.019)
SPS -0.381 0.103
(0.278) (0.372)
SPS.l 0.062 -0.029
(0.048) (0.064)
TBT 0.074 0.462
(0.310) (0.415)
TBT.l 0.013 -0.051
(0.055) (0.073)
Pre-shipment inspection 0.16 -0.637
(0.488) (0.652)
Pre-shipment inspection.l -0.043 0.1
(0.087) (0.117)
licensing -0.896*** 1.477***
(0.292) (0.390)
licensing.l 0.147*** -0.295***
(0.052) (0.070)
Variables TFP VaL
price control -10,221 -25,902
(38,558) (51,565)
price control.l 1,666 4,154
(6,129) (8,197)
competition -2.204* -4.609***
(1.198) (1.602)
competition.l 0.413** 0.834***
(0.206) (0.276)
export-related -0.291 0.48
(0.446) (0.597)
export-related.l 0.075 -0.073
(0.078) (0.104)
dummy FDI 0.061 -0.022
0.062 (0.083)
foreign ownership 0.024* 0.025
(0.014) (0.019)
R-sq 0.041 0.07
10

Results

  • A percent increase of tariff correlates with a 0.371% reduction in firms' TFP.

    • Positive tariff*l suggest a less severe impact for large firms.
    • These results are consistent without Fix effect.
  • NTMs are somewhat less important except for licensing (mostly quota restrictions) and competition (high presence of SOEs)

  • Value-added per Labor (VaL) has the opposite impact.

    • It may be the case that firms reduce labor even more than output, hence VaL↓↓
    • To test for this, I use percent change in labor as my dependant variable and rerun the regression.
11

Employment effect

Variables L1 L1FE
tariff -0.260*** -1.368***
(0.047) (0.063)
SPS -0.176 -1.650***
(0.153) (0.230)
TBT 0.064 0.452*
(0.236) (0.257)
Pre-shipment 0.066 1.997***
(0.349) (0.370)
licensing -0.818*** -4.455***
(0.190) (0.237)
Price-control 14,832*** 6,015
(4,381) -25,570
competition -0.999 -2.788***
(1.563) (1.006)
Export-related -0.246 -0.617*
(0.203) (0.333)
foreign dummy 0.028 0.091*
(0.031) (0.053)
observations 3,726 3,726
Variables L1 L1FE
tariff*l 0.043*** 0.251***
(0.008) (0.011)
SPS*l 0.021 0.288***
(0.027) (0.041)
TBT*l -0.008 -0.095**
(0.043) (0.045)
Pre-shipment*l -0.008 -0.345***
(0.061) (0.066)
licensing*l 0.140*** 0.809***
(0.036) (0.042)
Price-control*l -2,312*** -802
(695) (4,064)
competition*l 0.207 0.360**
(0.335) (0.163)
Export-related*l 0.042 0.132**
(0.036) (0.059)
% foreign -0.009 -0.007
(0.007) (0.011)
R-sq - 0.355
12

Results

  • Firms' employment is shrink with higher trade restrictions.

  • Correlations with NTMs are more significant.

  • Fix effect make the coefficient higher.

13

Policy and Conclusions

  • This paper provides yet more evidence that protectionism hurts manufacturing.

    • it leads to lower productivity and employment.
  • Additionally, bigger firms may have better ways to dampen the impact.

  • Overall, strategy to use manufacturing to improve the economy using trade policy would end up as a disaster.

  • Targeting CAD may not be ideal.

    • bad debt management can't be solved by protecting from import.
14

Caveats

  • TFP variable may reflect market power

  • NTMs have mixed results.

    • Count data isn't ideal
    • May have different impact for different types of NTMs
    • May have different impact on different goods
    • More in-depth studies are needed
  • The sample is quite restrictive.

    • Importers are different compared to general firms
    • the number of importers is very small
  • Data isn't perfect.

    • SI have many problems
    • Customs have not go beyond 2012 yet
15

References

  • Amiti, Mary, and Jozef Konings. 2007. "Trade Liberalization, Intermediate Inputs, and Productivity: Evidence from Indonesia." The American Economic Review 97 (5): 1611-1638. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282807783219733

  • An, Galina, and Keith E. Maskus. 2009. "The Impacts of Alignment with Global Product Standards on Exports of Firms in Developing Countries." World Economy 32 (4): 552-574. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2008.01150.x

  • Bas, Maria, and Vanessa Strauss-Kahn. 2014. "Does importing more inputs raise exports? Firm level evidence from France." Review of World Economics 150 (2): 35.

  • Cadot, Olivier, Alan Asprilla, Julien Gourdon, Christian Knebel, and Ralf Peters. 2015. Deep Regional Integration and Non-Tariff Measures: A Methodology for Data Analysis. United Nations (New York and Geneva: United Nations)

  • Castellani, Davide, and Claudio Fassio. 2019. "From new imported inputs to new exported products. Firm-level evidence from Sweden." Research Policy 48 (1): 322-338. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2018.08.021

  • Fugazza, Marco, Marcello Olarreaga, and Christian Ugarte. 2017. "On the heterogeneous effects of non-tariff measures: Panel evidence from Peruvian firms." UNCTAD Blue Series Papers 77. https://ideas.repec.org/p/unc/blupap/77.html

  • Ing, Lili Yan, Miaojie Yu, and Rui Zhang. 2019. "the evoltion of export quality: China and Indonesia." In World Trade Evolution: Growth, Productivity and Employment, edited by Lili Yan Ing and Miaojie Yu. Abingdon, New York: Routledge.

  • Levinsohn, James, and Amil Petrin. 2003. "Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Control for Unobservables." The Review of economic studies 70 (2): 317-341. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00246

  • Munadi, Ernawati. 2019. Indonesian non-tariff measures: updates and insights. Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia).

  • Pierola, Martha Denisse, Ana Margarida Fernandes, and Thomas Farole. 2018. "The role of imports for exporter performance in Peru." The World Economy 41 (2): 550-572. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12524

  • Pane, Deasy, and Arianto Patunru. 2019. "Does export performance improve firm performance? Evidence from Indonesia." Working Papers in Trade and Development 05

  • World Bank. 2020. World Development Report 2020 : Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains. Washington, DC: World Bank.

16

Some summary statistics

17

Firms' Characteristics

Table 1. Firms' characteristics, 2008-2012

Characteristics All_SI Non_customs Customs_only
foreign ownership (%) 8.15 5.96 34.77
(26.17) (22.60) (45.06)
fraction of output exported (%) 0.23 0.21 0.4
fraction of output exported (37.52) (0.37) (0.42)
fraction of input imported (%) 0.08 0.07 0.31
(0.24) (0.21) (0.38)
no. of labour employed 191.07 162.75 535.44
(711.73) (602.46) (1,457.65)
capital stock (Million IDR) 198 194 250
(44,800.00) (46,500) (10,400)
total intermediate input (Million IDR) 50.8 41 170
(617.00) (515) (1,330)
total output (Million IDR) 90.3 73.3 296
(958.00) (861) (1,740)
total value added (Million IDR) 38.5 31.6 123
(455.00) (414) (789)
value added per labour (IDR) 137,987.10 126,074 282,857
(2,515,300.00) (2,600,177) (1,012,159)
No. of observation 117,598 108,662 8,915
18

Average number of SPS is the highest

Table 2. Mean (St.Dev) of each NTM for all HS-6-digits

NTM Codes N2008 N2009 N2010 N2011 N2012 Examples
Sanitary & Phytosanitary (SPS) A 1.715 2.337 2.222 2.255 2.774 Authorization requirements
(2.644) (4.018) (3.950) (4.054) (5.128) Quarantine requirements
Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT) B 0.481 0.455 0.641 0.682 0.663 Testing requirements
(0.962) (0.978) (1.334) (1.361) (1.352) labeling requirements
Pre-shipment inspections and other formalities C 0.562 0.466 0.443 0.462 0.776 pre-shipment inspection
(1.202) (1.081) (1.059) (1.046) (1.075) only trough specific ports
Non-automatic licensing, quotas, QC, etc E 0.623 0.56 0.605 0.618 0.594 licensing
(0.809) (0.818) (0.873) (0.861) (0.853) quota
Price-control measures, extra taxes, charges F 0 0 0.015 0.014 0.016 customs service fee
(0.000) (0.000) (0.168) (0.165) (0.168) consumption tax
Measures affecting competition H 0.019 0.052 0.05 0.048 0.046 Only SOEs
(0.139) (0.238) (0.233) (0.229) (0.224) -
Export-related measures P 0.901 0.704 0.708 0.683 1.172 export permit
(1.172) (1.132) (1.109) (1.098) (1.465) export quota
observations - 1,675 2,204 2,318 2,400 2,510 -
19

Simple average of tariffs from 2008-2012

Table 3. Tariff from MoF regulations (left) compared to WITS (right)

Kind T2008 T2009 T2010 T2011 T2012
MFN 7.049 7.612 6.928 6.975 6.96
(12.213) (12.536) (8.037) (7.231) (7.145)
ASEAN 2.478 2.49 0.15 0.15 0.15
(11.094) (11.206) (4.559) (4.559) (4.559)
China 7.049 3.819 2.193 2.208 1.941
(12.213) (12.673) (7.941) (7.941) (7.927)
South Korea 7.049 2.624 1.912 1.912 1.542
(12.213) (12.265) (7.131) (7.131) (7.102)
India 7.049 7.612 6.394 5.874 5.341
(12.213) (12.536) (7.809) (7.517) (7.322)
Japan 6.11 4.639 3.274 2.618 2.23
(11.967) (12.356) (7.353) (7.114) (6.487)
ANZ 7.049 6.446 2.948 2.278 1.545
(12.213) (11.922) (6.765) (6.318) (6.065)
Kind T2008 T2009 T2010 T2011 T2012
MFN 7.762 7.595 7.564 7.051 7.053
(12.631) (12.456) (12.412) (7.015) (7.016)
ASEAN - 1.84 1.843 0.152 0.152
(11.079) (11.067) (4.285) (4.287)
China 3.665 2.743 1.85 1.579
(12.342) (12.392) (6.853) (6.823)
South Korea 2.564 2.56 1.698 1.326
(12.087) (12.084) (6.395) (6.349)
India - - 5.409 4.991
(6.726) (6.620)
Japan - -
ANZ
20

Coverage ratio

  • Table 5 shows simple mean (a) and coverage ratios (b)
  • As expected, tariffs lie between MFN and FTAs
  • Import licenses and quotas are more important than SPS and TBT
  • Coverage ratios vs simple mean:
    • no visual difference on tariff
    • firms import more goods with NTMs

Table 5a. Simple average

Variable Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Tariff 3.503 4.971 0 150
SPS (A) 0.108 0.718 0 29
TBT (B) 0.140 0.663 0 13
Pre-shipment inspection (C) 0.028 0.214 0 5
Licensing, quota, etc (E) 0.321 0.550 0 6
Price control etc (F) 0.000 0.008 0 2
Competition measures (H) 0.007 0.083 0 2
Export-related (P) 0.063 0.376 0 7

Table 5b. Coverage Ratio

Variable Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Tariff Coverage Ratio (T) 3.420 5.646 0 150
Coverage ratio A 0.246 0.931 0 19
Coverage ratio B 0.202 0.478 0 9
Coverage ratio C 0.059 0.237 0 4
Coverage ratio E 0.337 0.468 0 6
Coverage ratio F 0.000 0.001 0 0
Coverage ratio H 0.014 0.083 0 1
Coverage ratio P 0.110 0.353 0 7
21

Hello!

via GIPHY

About me

About this paper

  • Part of my dissertation.

  • click s.id/krisna-aifis for the slides.

  • click here for the pre-print.

2
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